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Abstract   
This study analyses the condominium management system in Amhara region in Ethiopia. 
Bahir Dar, which is the capital city of the Amhara National Regional State, was selected as 
a case to illustrate the issue under study. The paper used an institutional analysis and 
development (IAD) framework. The study revealed that post-occupancy management is 
one of the most pressing challenges that the implementation of Integrated Housing 
Development Programme faced in Bahir Dar city. It also revealed that, although Ostrom’s 
design principles are incorporated in the institution responsible for condominium 
management, they are not well configured and practised. Furthermore, the results show 
that, although Ostrom’s design principles are basic, they require proper interpretation in the 
context of condominium management.  
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1. Introduction  
Housing is one of the basic necessities for human beings. However, it is a 
critical problem for millions of poor people in developing countries, and 
Ethiopia is no exception (Bihon, 2007). Ethiopia’s urban centres are 
characterized by poorly developed economic base. Like most urban centres of 
developing countries, most cities and towns in Ethiopia face a plethora of 
problems, including an acute and ever-worsening housing shortage (Solomon 
& McLeod, 2004).  
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Until recently, in Ethiopia, there was no specific legislation that 
recognized citizens’ right to housing or which imposed a duty on the 
government to recognize that right. Nevertheless, there were few national 
coordination policies regarding housing and urban development.  During the 
first half of the 20th century, land and housing in Ethiopia were controlled by 
a few individuals and groups. Housing supply was controlled by the 
landowning elite who constitute less than one per cent of the population but 
own more than 70% of the arable land (UN-HABITAT, 2007).  
When the Derg regime came to power in 1974, it declared 
(Proclamation No. 47/1975) government ownership of urban lands, and rental 
dwellings or extra houses (a person is not allowed to have more than one 
house). Consequently, ownership of all urban land and extra houses were 
transferred to the government in an effort to enforce a fair distribution of 
wealth across the country. During the Derg regime (1974–1991), housing 
supply was controlled by the central government and urban residents were 
allowed to keep one residential house and another business house, if 
necessary. Housing supply was insufficient to meet the large demand and all 
cities in Ethiopia experienced acute housing shortages and ever-deteriorating 
housing conditions (Teshome, 2008).    
In the late 1980s, the Derg regime loosened its control on the supply of 
housing by allowing private house owners and tenants of public premises to 
sell and exchange their houses. The government declared (Proclamation No. 
292/1986) that specified “residential buildings could be produced only by 
state enterprises, municipal governments, housing cooperatives and 
individuals who build dwellings for their personal consumption”. This 
declaration was an opportunity for large-scale private sector housing 
developers to cater for the large demand among high-income earners and 
there was little incentive to construct low-income housing (Mulugeta, 1995). 
The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) that 
overthrew the Derg regime in 1991 designed a new tenure system for urban 
Ethiopia. Leasehold as a land tenure system was introduced in 1993 and then 
revised in 2002 and 2011. It is believed that transferring the tenure of urban 
land through fair-priced leases is helping the expansion of the housing market. 
In order to support the housing market, the government has also provided 
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various incentives, including the allocation of urban land at highly subsidised 
rates or free of charge, and subsidies to offset the cost of building materials. 
Nevertheless, these incentives ultimately helped to satisfy only a small 
portion of the housing demand, and the private sector failed to deliver 
affordable housing at large scale (UN-HABITAT, 2010).    
By the mid-2000s, however, changes started to take place in the 
governing and planning of urban areas. Pressures were increasing to improve 
the coordination of urban policy and to re-create some form of strategic 
planning approach. Consequently, the Ministry of Works and Urban 
Development (MWUD) was established in 2005 and it developed the 
Integrated Housing Development Programme (IHDP). The IHDP has four 
major objectives: 1) to increase housing supply for the low-income 
population, 2) to address the problem of urban slum areas and mitigate their 
expansion in the future, 3) to increase job opportunities for micro and small 
enterprises and unskilled labourers, which will, in turn, provide income for 
their families and enable them to afford their own housing, and 4) to improve 
wealth creation and wealth distribution for the nation (MWUD, 2007).  
Since 2005, Ethiopia has been implementing an ambitious government-
led low- and middle-income housing programme. The programme involves a 
radical shift from the single-storey detached housing typology (government-
owned rental housing) to a new condominium typology (private 
homeownership). According to the programme, all slums would be cleared 
within ten years of the programme’s introduction. To make the programme 
feasible, the state transferred the overall responsibility for the housing sector 
at the regional level to city administrations or municipalities. At the regional 
level, the Bureau of Works and Urban Development (BWUD) is responsible 
for urban management and development issues. One way to assess the 
government housing programme is by studying condominium commons. 
Understanding the concept of condominium commons and their management 
is also essential for dealing with a wide variety of issues, particularly the need 
for residents in condominium houses to live in peace and security.  
A small number of empirical studies (Haregewoin, 2007; Sema, 2010; 
Ingwani, Gondo, Gumbo, and Mazhindu, 2010) have examined the quality 
and management of the currently supplied residential condominiums houses. 
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The methods adopted in these studies to evaluate the quality of housing have 
measured quality by using indicators such as availability of adequate space 
for privacy and mobility and the physical condition of the houses. Concerning 
the physical condition of housing, these studies find that many condominium 
buildings, which are less than a decade old, are dilapidated and obsolete due 
to a of lack of training related to production and construction techniques and 
construction management. Till date, there has not been an institutional 
analysis of the management system for condominium houses.  
This aspect of housing is worth of study because, in Ethiopia, there is a 
national law on how condominiums should be established and regulated and 
how they should function. Normally, the ownership of condominium housing 
is also regulated.  Similar laws are now in force in many regions of the 
country. Concerning the issue of governance, both the federal and Amhara 
regional legal regulations require the establishment of an owners’ association 
in each privatized multi-dwelling residential building, or group of buildings, 
to act on behalf of all the owners in legal matters of common ownership. 
Membership of owners’ associations is also a legal requirement (FDRE 
Condominium Proclamation No. 370/2003; ANRS Condominium 
Proclamation No. 144/2006). However, the present day post-occupancy 
management set up, on the basis of collective management, is often fraught 
with difficulties. For example, a study conducted by UN-HABITAT (2010) 
revealed problems in post-occupation management and monitoring in Addis 
Ababa. This study showed that, while some self-organized resident 
associations have taken over the ownership and management of common 
facilities in condominium units, the majority of them remain locked and thus 
unusable until agreement is reached between residents and the government. 
Yet, in response to post-occupancy issues, this study also failed to recognise 
the importance of analysing the governing rules. 
In the case of Bahir Dar city, self-organized resident associations have 
taken over the ownership and management of common facilities in 
condominium units (ANRS Condominium Proclamation No. 144/2006). The 
governing rules in matters of common ownership closely resemble Ostrom’s 
famous design principles for managing common property resource regimes. In 
relation to the condominium management system in the Amhara region, one 
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of the major challenges facing the IHDP concerns post-occupation 
management, which has received very little attention to date. This study, 
therefore, analyses the condominium management system in Bahir Dar city. 
In particular, this study examines the relationship between institutional 
structures, collective action and the performance of owners’ associations in 
relation to Ostrom’s design principles. The Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework was used for the analysis of linkages between 
livelihood outcomes of the common resource users, and delivery and 
governance results, together with additional linkages in the institutional 
context. This institutional context can help to clarify the pathways by which 
particular interventions at the field level might contribute to wider change at 
the policy and institutional level. 
Following this section, the rest of the paper is structured in the following 
manner: Part 2 examines the IAD framework advantages over others and why 
it is appropriate to explain the situation in this paper; Part 3 looks at research 
methods including all techniques/ methods adopted for conducting this paper; 
Part 4 considers results and discussions, and finally part 5 deals with 
conclusion, policy implications and recommendations. 
 
2. Analytical Framework  
There are several models that can be used for institutional analysis (Gordon, 
1954, Hardin, 1968; Oakerson, 1986; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, Gardner, & 
Walker, 1994). Based on theoretical and empirical evidence gathered from a 
variety of sources, Ostrom (1998) argues that various models and institutions 
for the analysis of common property problems can be useful in helping to 
conceptualize some of the incentives in simple situations involving various 
forms of commons. However, Ostrom states that the relevance of most of the 
models, and institutions is limited since they do not apply to complex and 
dynamic real world situations. Ostrom also carefully distinguishes the notion 
of a model from that of a framework.  While a model is understand as 
anything used in any way to represent anything else. The development and 
use of models involve making precise assumptions about a limited set of 
variables and parameters to derive precise predictions about the results of 
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This IAD framework posits three very broad clusters of variables affecting 
institutional design and the patterns of interaction occurring within action 
arenas. The three interrelated components are (1) the underlying factors (the 
physical/material characteristics, the attributes of the relevant community, and 
the rules-in-use at several levels); (2) the action arenas; and (3) patterns of 
interaction and outcomes.  Based on the IAD framework, Ostrom (1990) and 
Ostrom et al. (1994) argue that, for robust and enduring institutions for 
common property resource management, if the physical, user and institutional 
characteristics are substantially changed, it is reasonable to expect that the 
actions and the patterns of behaviour will change in order to achieve 
successful and sustainable outcomes.  Thus, to investigate how different 
governance systems enable individuals to solve problems by using the IAD 
framework, analyst first start the analysis with understanding how attributes 
of the physical, community and rules affect action situations. A key part of 
the analysis is then focuses on action arena by examining the component parts 
of it and investigates the resulting patterns of interactions and outcomes, and 
evaluating these outcomes. 
 As indicated, in institutional analysis, the first component examined by 
IAD stipulates the physical, users’ and institutional characteristics. According 
to Ostrom (1990), the analysis with the physical/technical and community 
characteristics is important to understand the nature of the resource being 
shared, the culture and history of the community, its social and political 
characteristic, underlying reason for the collective-action problem and 
effectiveness of community organization. The attributes of institutions/rules 
are also the central focus of the institutional analysis. Ostrom (1990) defines 
institutions as formal and informal rules that are understood and used by a 
community. The term ‘institution’, in this study, therefore, means the rules 
that establish the working “dos and don’ts” for condominium owners. 
 The second component of the IAD framework focuses on action arena 
contained an action situation and actors. Ostrom explains the ‘action arenas’ 
as rules and authority relationships that specifies who decides what in relation 
to whom.  Action arenas can occur throughout all levels of rule and decision 
making, including the operational-choice, collective-choice, and 
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constitutional-choice levels. An important aspect of action arena is that, the 
problem could be at an operational tier where actors interact in light of the 
incentives they face to generate outcomes directly in the world.  The problem 
could also be at a policy (or collective-choice) tier where decision makers 
repeatedly have to make policy decisions within the constraints of a set of 
collective-choice rules. The problem could as well be at a constitutional tier 
where decisions are made about who is eligible to participate in policymaking 
and about the rules that will be used to undertake policymaking. Thus, a key 
part of the institutional analysis is identification of an action situation and 
actors. The analysis needs to look at the specific participants and the roles 
they play within the action situation. In analysing action situations, 
particularly concern with understanding the incentives, value and beliefs 
facing diverse participants is also critical.  
 The third component of IAD framework explores patterns of interaction 
and their associated outcomes. According to Ostrom (1990), ‘patterns of 
interaction and outcomes’ refers to the way how users of common resource 
interact and predicts outcomes that are more or less likely to result from a 
particular type of situation. The patterns of interaction are intricately linked to 
the action situations. Thus, depending upon the analytical structure of action 
situation and the particular assumptions about the actor used, the institutional 
analyst can makes strong or weak inferences about outcomes. In addition to 
predicting outcomes, the institutional analyst need to evaluate the outcomes 
that are being achieved as well as the likely set of outcomes that could be 
achieved under alternative institutional arrangements. Although institutional 
analysts may use many evaluative criteria, Ostrom et al. (1994) suggested 
that, the essential evaluative criteria for any commons analysis are inevitably 
equity, efficiency, and sustainability.  
The institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework is based 
on the assumption that most problems in development arise because people 
cannot take the necessary collective action. Post-occupancy management of 
condominium houses are among the major causes of problems faced during 
the implementation of development projects such as IHDP. Examining rules 
that condominium unit owners play at differently level is relevant to 
understand problems associated with the likely consequences of institutional 
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arrangement.  Because, the strategic structure of the institutions may provide 
weak or perverse incentives to individuals and groups to act collectively in 
matters of condominium management. However, limited attention has been 
paid to many institutional issues at the level of trouble shooting, project 
supervision, monitoring and evaluation of IHDP. Therefore, it is unlikely that 
a complete institutional analysis can be performed as part of the monitoring 
and evaluation of an on-going IHDP. In order to have a complete institutional 
analysis, there must be analysis applied to specific sets of issues or problems 
that arise in the course of implementation. According to Ostrom et al. (1994), 
a project or programme should be appraised and its implementation needs 
evaluated and analysed in the following sequence: context, action arenas, 
pattern of interaction and outcomes. Thus, the institutional analysis of 
condominium development in Bahir Dar city in general and the 
implementation of IHDP in particular, can also be analysed in the sequence 
recommended by Ostrom (1990). 
Employing the IAD framework in this study is essential not only to 
examine the above basic variables affecting institutional design, but also to 
understand the relationships between these variables. Moreover, in this study, 
the IAD framework was used to identify, describe and analyse the relationship 
between institutional structure, collective action and the performance of 
ownership associations in relation with Ostrom’s design principles. IAD 
involves most of the variables within the institutions designed for 
condominium management in Bahir Dar city that affect the action situation 
and the participants involved. Changes to these variables result in varying 
patterns of interaction and outcomes. 
It has to be stressed, however, that the IAD framework does not address 
the question of how to craft the laws governing commons and who should do 
so. Experiences from developed countries such as Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand which have undertaken reform in housing management indicate that a 
lack of resident participation in the formulation of laws is one of the problems 
associated with housing management (Lau, 2002). Therefore, this study first 
needs to examine the evolution of the institution and then conduct an 
institutional analysis by using IAD as the analytical framework for the 
investigation.  
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In this paper, therefore, by using IAD framework, institutional analysis 
started by gaining an understanding of the context of physical situation 
associated with the condominium housing project. This involved examining 
nature of the commons in condominium houses, the attributes of the residents, 
identifying problems related with residents organization and implementation 
of the rules-in-use/institutions. After understanding the context, the paper 
focused on analyses of collective action decisions which are affected by the 
physical, community, and institutional characteristics which, in turn, result in 
various patterns of interactions and outcomes. In this case, the paper tried to 
identify actors and their roles to play within the action situation. In addition, 
the analysis attempted to identify an action situation/ the social spaces/ where 
residents interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems, and dominate 
one another. This analysis utilized to describe, analyze, predict, and explain 
behaviour within institutional arrangements. After making an effort to 
understand action arena, the paper analysis proceeded toward examining 
details of pattern of interaction and associated outcomes.  
Within the broad spectrum of condominium management, there are a 
myriad number of competing outcomes that require evaluation; some of them 
are considered negative, while others are seen as positive. While analysing 
outcomes in this study, evaluative criteria suggested by Ostrom et al. (1994) 
have been used.  This study  uses Ostrom’s  (1990) eight predefined variables 
as a base for describing the institution governing the use of condominium 
houses in Bahir Dar city.  
 
3. Methodology  
In this study, the IAD analysis attempts to understand one of the most 
fundamental social questions: how residents of condominium houses 
cooperate or do not cooperate with each other in various circumstances. The 
analysis also tries to identify the specific participants and the roles they play. 
This study used a qualitative descriptive case study to understand the issue 
from the point of view of the participants and to understand its particular 
social and institutional context (Flick, 2002). Based on the purpose of the 
study, the first criterion in selecting a case should be to maximize what we 
can learn (Stake, 1995), because profound understanding of a phenomenon 
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depends on choosing the best possible case (Yin, 2009). Therefore, from 
several cities in the Amhara region where condominium construction and 
distribution have taken place, Bahir Dar was selected because condominium 
construction and distribution started there first  and thus better information on 
condominium management can be obtained. Moreover, as it is the capital city 
of the regional state, it is easy to get first-hand information from people who 
actively participate in law making and condominium projects. 
Document reviews, interviews, and a questionnaire were used to collect 
data. Document review was used to collect data from the IHDP on 
condominium proclamations, by-laws, rules and other relevant regulations, 
particularly on condominium management issues in both printed and 
electronic form. In fact, collections of data from documents were made before 
any other sources. Interviews were intended to elicit views and opinions from 
the key informants selected based on their close link to the preparation and 
implementation of institutional arrangement for condominium management 
and experiences of working in ownership associations. As a result, interviews 
were used to collect data from: selected board members of owners 
associations who are responsible for managing the condominium on behalf of 
unit owners; elected technical committees and local elders who are 
responsible for social activities including conflict resolution; and Bahir Dar 
city administration and condominium housing project directors and managers 
who are responsible for construction, allocation for  condominium ownership 
and for setting up the rules and regulations which govern their use. The 
interviews were semi-structured because this makes it possible to focus on the 
main issues and to incorporate other issues which may arise during the 
interviews. The interview guide was designed to guide the interviews in a 
focused, yet flexible and conversational manner (Minichiello, Aroni, 
Timewell, & Alexander, 1990). In order to get detailed information and adapt 
questioning to the answers of the informants; face-to-face qualitative in-depth 
interviews were used. Data collection from interviews was entirely conducted 
in Bahir Dar city from 15 July – 3 August 201. 
The questionnaire was used to collect data about collective actions, 
residents and their unit characteristics, cooperation towards collective action 
(resident’s values, preferences and motivations), and also to comprehend the 
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relationship between diversity of respondents and their unit attributes and 
post-occupancy management issues. The total number of condominium units 
distributed to beneficiaries in Bahir Dar city is 1,618, of which 1,513 are 
residential units (305 studios, 681 are single bedrooms, 439 are double 
bedrooms and 88 are triple bedrooms) and 105 are commercial units. For the 
purpose of selecting participants from residential unit users, first, based on 
each type of condominium unit user, stratified sampling was employed and 
then simple random sampling was used to select participants to represent each 
type of residential user. On the other hand, in order to select participants from 
commercial unit users, simple random sampling was used.  
The questionnaires were administered to 405 condominium houses 
residents residing in 10 kebeles of Bahir Dar city (kebele refers to the smallest 
administrative unit in Ethiopia). And 328 questionnaires were filled and 
returned which is a response rate of about 81%. There are three main reasons 
for the high response rate. First, before the actual data collection, a pilot study 
was undertaken in two condominium blocks using questionnaires prepared in 
English. The rate of response was relatively low, it was about 34%.  Through 
an informal discussion with the respondents, I realized that they had 
difficulties fully understanding and responding to questions. Participants 
preferred to be communicated to in a language which they could easily 
understand. Hence, questionnaires were translated into Amharic, the local 
language used in the study area. Second, people living in condominium 
houses reported several problems and they believed the outcome of this study 
would be seriously considered by stakeholders and be part of the solution. 
Third, questionnaires were administered house-to-house and collected in 
person by the researcher himself and trained assistants. Collections of data 
from questionnaires were started and finalized on 5 August 2011 and 23 
August 2011 respectively.  
All the collected data were transcribed and then analysed. Thematic 
analysis was used to provide a rich thematic description of the data set. 
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4. Results and Discussion  
The presentation and analysis of the findings are categorized into five 
thematic sections. The first section deals with the assessment of the historical 
evolution of institutional arrangements for condominium housing 
management, the nature of the commons, the attributes of users and the 
community, and rules-in-use. The second section discusses the decision-
making arrangements by using the IAD framework which helps to organise 
and explain behaviour in policy systems. The third section deals with the 
institutional characteristics of an action situation and the behaviour of unit 
users in the resulting structure. The fourth section discusses the pattern of 
interaction, and the fifth section focuses on analysing outcomes.  
 
4.1 Evolution of institutions  
The Amhara National Regional State (ANRS) established proposed model 
rules and regulations on condominium ownership under the umbrella of 
ANRS Condominium Proclamation No. 144/2006. These model rules were 
prepared by a housing committee formed under the city administration. 
According to the director of the city administration, the main roles and 
responsibilities of the committee in crafting institutions are the following:  
Selected committees have responsibility for reviewing overall national and 
regional housing, particularly condominium housing policy and strategies; 
reviewing the practice of the condominium housing sector in both developing 
and developed countries where multi-flat housing estates have become the 
dominant type of tenure; and proposing a legal framework for the effective 
establishment and operation of owners’ associations that shall apply only in the 
Amhara region. 
Unless there is a long-term effort to help condominium unit owners 
understand and be involved in formulating new regulations, it may be difficult 
for them to fully understand them. This study included two important 
interview questions for informants who were responsible for and had actively 
participated in the establishment of model condominium rules and 
regulations: (1) why had authorities failed to identify potential condominium 
house owners and failed to allow owners to participate in formulating 
regulations? (2) what assurance mechanisms have been used to overcome 
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these difficulties and ensure learning and commitment by condominium unit 
users? In response to the first question, the Director of the City 
Administration said: 
I believe that inclusion and participation of unit owners in the preparation of 
new institutional arrangements for condominium houses engenders trust and 
acceptance, particularly among potential unit owners and it reduces the risk of 
conflict. However, while establishing the institution it was impossible to 
identify potential purchasers of condominium units and we never attempted to 
come together to negotiate and formulate institutional arrangements with 
potential purchasers. 
According to the director it was not easy to know who already had a 
house and who did not. Thus, identifying potential purchasers may have taken 
longer and there would have been much disagreement about how the 
condominium houses had to be managed.  
Concerning the second question, the Director said, “the proposed 
institutional arrangements were introduced along with conditions favourable 
for the success of collective action, learning and adaptation to changing 
socioeconomic, ecological, and policy environments”. The manager had two 
justifications: 1) “the need for resident participation in condominium housing 
affairs originates before buyers decide to buy a unit, because condominium 
unit buyers have the right to be informed of all laws, rules and regulations and 
to be advised by experts before they decide to buy a condominium unit”. He 
also recognized an outsider may find it difficult to formulate successful 
institutional arrangements and buyers may not be fully satisfied with the 
regulations. However, to overcome these difficulties and to ensure a good 
living environment, he said, “a particular point in the agreement model covers 
the voting rights of the owners at general meetings to adopt or amend the 
declaration, description by-laws, and rules according to the interest of the 
majority of residents”. According to this argument, if residents are dissatisfied 
with condominium housing management under the existing conditions, the 
statutory provisions give them the right to change, modify or amend the laws, 
declarations, by-laws and rules, but changes need to be approved by a two-
thirds majority vote of unit owners. 
In relation to this issue, residents were asked whether they had enough 
information on how condominium ownership was managed and how they 
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could exercise their rights. Surprisingly, the study found many features of 
institutions that were assumed to be known by the users were not even known 
by original purchaser of the units, let alone by renters. Most respondents 
(97%) confirmed that neither the City Administration Registrar nor the 
owners associations informed them about such laws. However, it was found 
that purchasers of condominium units had been declaring their registered 
building to be governed under ANRS, 2006 Condominium Proclamation No. 
144/2006 together with a declaration, description and model rules. 
Documentary analysis of laws on condominiums shows that normative 
instructions are merely written in proclamations and are not known by the 
owners of the condominiums. Thus, these institutional arrangements were 
considered to be rules-in-form not rule-in-use. Furthermore, the documentary 
analysis showed that the city administration enthusiastically proposed 
blueprint, cookie-cutter approaches to community condominium management. 
Hence, the details of these approaches were based on Ostrom’s design 
principles that have been applied across multiple contexts.  
Regarding the jointly owned parts of condominiums – commons, the 
ANRS model agreement document (2006) defines ‘commons’ as all parts of 
the condominium except the units. This common property is owned jointly by 
the owners of the units and includes the roof, staircases, exterior walls and 
windows, building foundations, and infrastructure such as water pipes and 
electric cables which are outside the units. The rules also define unit users’ 
rights over their units and commons. The latter rights are undivided and are 
attached to the unit ownership. The principles of the nature of the commons in 
condominium management discussed above clearly link to the design 
principles through the fundamental idea that there is a clear demarcation of 
what constitutes commons and individual units. Moreover, ANRS (2006), 
proclamation No. 144/2006 stipulates that without prejudice to other 
provisions of this proclamation, unit owners shall contribute to covering 
common expenses in proportion to their undivided interest in the common 
elements and that the share of such undivided interests shall be determined in 
accordance with the standards set in the declaration for the particular unit. 
This also indicates congruence between the rules that assign benefits and 
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those that assign costs. The crucial thing here is that these rules should be 
considered as fair and legitimate by the unit users themselves.  
Ostrom’s (1990) first design principle refers to clearly defined 
boundaries. As Agrawal (2002) notes, the presence of well-defined 
boundaries around a community of users and boundaries around the resource 
system helps to internalize the positive and negative externalities produced by 
participants, so that they bear the costs of appropriation and receive some of 
the benefits of the resource. Concentration on boundaries highlights the need 
in development for clear administrative arrangements. Turner (1999) states 
that practitioners tend to expect the community to be an immutable group of 
people jointly managing a delimited common resource through uncontested, 
clearly defined rules of access. The practice in condominium management 
showed that up to the final date of data collection, 23 August 2011, despite a 
law which clearly demarcates what is deemed to be individual property and 
jointly owned property, there is no legal requirement that any expense be 
allocated according to ownership percentage. This study gives an example of 
how a system of fluid boundaries can persist, and the boundaries between 
different groups of condominium unit users in Bahir Dar city are fuzzy. It also 
indicates that jointly managed common areas to which ownership fractions 
and responsibility for the costs of maintaining and repairing the common parts 
of the property is negotiated temporarily among interested parties. 
Some literature (ECE, 2003;Yip et al, 2007) empirically suggests that if 
residents of condominiums reflect a high degree of social, economic and 
cultural homogeneity and they exclusively use commons elements whose 
availability is uncertain or limited, users are more likely to facilitate collective 
action to deal with the problem.  This study tried to identify what constituted 
the unique characteristics in each set of condominiums through a pilot study 
and then questions were developed on some specific attributes that 
contributed to problems. In this study, owners’ associations characterized by 
homogenous attributes were defined as “those building blocks with a high 
proportion of owner occupiers in which the majority of the residents are 
married and have children”, whereas heterogeneous communities were 
defined as “those building blocks whose renters/owners/ occupiers ratio is low 
and the majority of the residents are single”. There is an assumption that 
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owners’ associations characterized by homogenous communities will do well 
since there would be a high incentive to cooperate in collective action.  
To identify the impacts of community attributes, residents were asked 
about the presence of cooperation in such buildings. If cooperation was 
lacking, they were also asked to explain why. Although this study found only 
two associations to be homogeneous, their responses clearly proved that there 
was no cooperation among residents and indicated the poor performance of 
owners’ associations similar to that of owners’ associations in heterogeneous 
communities. The major reasons for this poor cooperation, evidenced by both 
types of condominium resident respondents, had nothing to do with the 
community attributes as identified by this study. Rather, the reasons for non-
cooperation were found to be a lack of socialization about life in a 
condominium, a lack of guidance and instruction on how to manage 
condominiums properly, the absence of detailed regulations as a legal 
protection for regulating the management of the condominium, the lack of a 
prudent balance of the rights and obligations of owners, and a failure to 
enforce reasonable rules and regulations.  
Ostrom’s (1990) second design principle refers to the congruence 
between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions. Agrawal 
(2002) recognizes this principle and stipulates that both appropriation and 
provision rules should conform in some way to local conditions. Congruence 
needs to exist between appropriation and provision rules. Some scholars have 
highlighted the negative consequences that result when externally imposed 
rules do not match local customs and livelihood strategies (Gautam and 
Shivakoti, 2005). In this regard, the study found that the existing institutions 
did not match with the local situation. This was shown through an analysis of 
the law that stipulates that owners or their official agents are the only ones 
who are allowed to participate in general meetings to decide on matters 
related to payments for covering the cost of condominium commons. 
However, the survey’s results indicated that most buildings are dominated by 
renters (83%) who are not being given decision-making powers. Owner-
residents constitute a smaller proportion (17%). This has significant 
implications for the current condominium management system of the city. 
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One member of owners’ association, based on his practical experience 
said, “many of the renters have an interest in carrying out or being responsible 
for activities in the condominium, which are not even specified in the law. On 
the other hand, renters are not allowed to deal with the issues at general 
meetings and it is possible that some of the rules are not well-matched with 
the current practical conditions”. According to him, both the owners and 
renters should be charged with the cost associated in the day-to-day 
management of the owners’ association, which has to see to the maintenance 
and operation of the condominium commons and all matters of common 
interest. 
Congruence between appropriation and provision rules is frequently 
described in the literature as congruence between costs incurred by users and 
the benefits they receive via their participation in collective action (Cox, et al, 
2010). Some scholars state that in successful systems, individuals have an 
expectation that the benefits to be derived from participation in and 
compliance with community-based management will exceed the costs of their 
investment in such activities (Pomeroy, Katon, & Harkes, 2001). This study 
found that, although there are appropriation rules that determine benefits to 
owners of condominium units, there is no provision rule that determines each 
owner’s responsibility for the costs of maintaining and repairing the common 
parts of the property, or for the operating costs of the owners’ association.  
Representatives from the owners’ associations were asked about the 
assumptions upon which each owner’s responsibility for the costs of 
maintaining the commons and the operating costs of the owners’ association 
are based. The study found that due to the absence of provisions in the legal 
framework that specify each unit owner’s  share of the common property and 
their share of the responsibility of paying the costs, in all associations  the 
owners’ contributions had to be determined in general meetings. The study 
also found that the calculation of condominium fees varies from one owner’s 
association to another since they depend on agreements reached at general 
meetings. However, under the current system, each owner in a given 
association makes “an equal monthly payment” to the group bank account 
regardless of the type of unit they own. One of the important elements 
missing in the institutional arrangement that requires urgent reform is the 
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provision of clear information for residents about their specific rights and 
obligations in their units and commons and the concept of a share of 
undivided interest in the commons.  
For the question of why a declaration of division of ownership has not 
yet become a legal requirement in the Amhara region, the director of the 
Bahir Dar city housing development agency said:  “the main reason is that 
when transferring condominium units, the price of the communal buildings 
was not included in the unit purchase price and this has created problems for 
coming up with declarations about divisions of ownership. However, we are 
thinking about it.” This implies the unit owners do not own a share of the 
commons. With respect to individual unit owners’ rights to use condominium 
commons, there is no boundary at all.  Each owner has full and unlimited 
ownership rights to commons, even if their shares of the common property of 
the condominium are not equal.  
It has to be stressed, however, that the ownership fraction applies only 
to the common property of the condominium and cannot be the only factor 
that determine each owner’s charges with the costs of maintaining, repairing, 
as well as for the operating costs of the owners’ association. Difference in 
intensity of use (number of households per unit) and characteristics of the 
condominium unit (commercial or residential (studios, single bedrooms, 
double bedrooms and triple bedrooms) embedded in the condominium 
building are also very important to determines each owner’s responsibility 
and have encouraging or discouraging effect on participation of 
owners/residents in condominium management. For example, higher intensity 
of use tends to be associated with high changes in the use of the unit and 
common. This problem requires an immediate response from the responsible 
body. Specific solutions based on problems must therefore be adapted to 
condominium management system of the city. 
 
4.2 Decision-making arrangements  
Ostrom’s (1990) third design principle is that collective-choice arrangements 
are needed. This principle means that most individuals that are affected by 
operational rules should be able to participate in modifying them (Ostrom, 
1990). The lack of a functional collective-choice arrangement is frequently 
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correlated with common pool resources management failure. For example, 
discussing communal land use and management practices and related 
problems in Ethiopia, Asemamaw (2010) describes a case of failure wherein 
residents of South Achefer Woreda village were members of the decision-
making village assembly, but the assembly was ineffective as a decision-
making body.  
The data obtained from condominium laws of the Amhara region 
indicate the existence of a rule consistent with the third design principle 
through the fundamental idea that unit users of condominium houses have the 
right to participate in collective decisions and in modifying rules for regular 
operation of the resource over time.  The law clearly states that each unit 
owner has a right to elect board members of the association and to stand for 
elections (ANRS, 2006), proclamation No. 144/2006). Based on this law, it 
seems that the institutions that govern condominium management in Bahir 
Dar city are consistent with Ostrom’s third principle regarding collective 
action management. It has to be stressed, however, that the rules governing 
condominiums are assumed and used in a manner that implies solidarity and 
homogeneity among unit users. Hence, the laws allow only the owners 
(buyers) or their agents to participate in decision making and to take 
collective actions, forbidding renters from exercising such a privilege. In fact, 
laws on condominium in Amhara region shows that, in the condominium 
housing the positions of renters are insignificant in term of status and power. 
This implies that renters’ participation in decision making about 
condominium housing has been limited and organised on an ad-hoc basis. 
Furthermore, it implies that ‘actually existing principles’ may differ 
significantly from the rhetoric contained in the policy documents. 
Although owners do not interact with each other, they are responsible 
for making rules governing day-to-day activities and collective actions. The 
implication is that, in condominium buildings, the rules decided by owners 
will affect the behaviour of renters and their ability to develop mutual respect. 
Thus, in order to determine whether the rule in use helps to develop mutual 
respect or not, residents were asked a wide range of questions on how the 
rules were affecting their motivation, interactions, and actions. Most of the 
renters (92%) felt that the rules should be amended or adopted by the mutual 
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involvement of renters and owners. Similarly, most owners (87%) stated that 
they do not understand the true nature of the problems in condominiums since 
they rent out their units. Also, the owners added that it is the renters who 
should have the right to make decisions as they are the ones who are really 
experiencing the problems. Only a few owners (13%) opposed these views. 
The main reason for this latter group was that they thought most of the renters 
were unlikely to stay in condominiums for long and they might adopt laws 
that are not in the interests of the owners. A more philosophical issue is 
whether current renters have the legal and moral authority to bind future 
renters by the present actions and decisions 
To complement these findings, interviews were conducted with board 
members of the associations and committees.  The interviewed informants 
affirmed that in order to create effective institutional design, rules need to be 
amended and changed by the participation of both renters and owners. And 
that the decision makers should have adequate information, awareness, or 
understanding of the nature of problems involved. The board members also 
strongly argued that if renters were allowed to participate in making 
decisions, the common values of the community would be improved and 
shared, which, in turn, would substantially affect the strategies adopted within 
action arenas and the resulting patterns of interaction.  
Although incentives to cooperate might exist in the law, this does not 
guarantee that users will cooperate, particularly in situations where the real 
users involved in common use are not taking part in decision making. Renters, 
who are inhibited from involving in modifying rules and making proposals for 
change, may simply begin to cheat whenever they have the opportunity. Once 
cheating on rules becomes more frequent for some renters, others will follow 
suit. In this case, enforcement costs become very high or the system fails. 
Thus excluding renters from participation in collective action is against 
Ostrom’s principles, which contend that those involved in common use 
should take part in decision making about the commons. In relation to this 
issue, one of the board members said, “it is important to stress that the board 
and the manager cannot operate successfully if they only have the support of 
the owners when the condominium block is dominated by renters”. According 
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to him, renters who are not aware of the rules and regulations do not show the 
same pride of ownership and sense of community and security as owners.  
In support of the above views, another board member said, “one of the 
most challenging situations for the association is the fact that the associations 
do not have the opportunity to meet with renters and deal with the real 
problems and provide possible solutions”. Since it is the owners who  do not 
have much information about the actual situations and who are allowed to 
participate and deal with the issues at general meetings, decisions are being 
made to address short-term dilemmas and long-term solutions are not being 
sought.  
Regarding the question of the rights and obligations of renters in 
condominium buildings, data collected through questionnaire showed that 
most of them (84%) were only responsible for paying rent according to the 
contract and few renters (16%) officially have delegated rights and 
obligations as owners. According to the renters, the city administration 
condominium housing authorities, as well as owners’ associations, consider 
them as people who have severely limited rights. They felt this orientation is 
the reason awareness and sensitivity of housing officials and owners 
associations about renters’ dissatisfaction was very low.   
Most owners (94%) believed that renters’ participation in collective 
action is inevitable because it is renters who are most affected by changes that 
might affect service provisions and are worried about increases in 
management fees. Consistent with this finding, most owners’ agents (93%) 
reported that they have obtained a high degree of trust from their owners’ 
associations. It is no surprise, therefore, that most owners felt that letting 
renters participate in the general meetings will create greater incentives for 
developing trust and mutual respect.   
Regarding this issue, some of the board members believed that helping 
renters to get involved in managing condominium affairs is a way to create 
incentives to cooperate. One of the board members said, “no matter how high 
the level of agreement stated in the rules, it is unwise to think that all unit 
users will act according to the rules since experience indicates that creating 
mutual respect among residents and encouraging them to cooperate is not 
enough”. When the owners’ association board asked about what mechanisms 
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should be introduced to involve renters in collective action, they affirmed 
that, although ownership of a unit and membership of the association is 
inseparable, owners need to transfer their membership of the association to 
renters when they rent out their unit and the renters should not be able to 
refuse this membership or avoid the responsibility of participating in general 
meetings. 
 
4.3 Institutional characteristics of an action situation  
The other three most important ingredients for successful collective action 
identified by Ostrom (1990) are effective monitoring, graduated sanctions and 
low cost conflict resolution mechanisms. According to Ostrom (1990) 
effective monitoring is, making those who do not comply with rules visible to 
the community, which facilitates the effectiveness of rule enforcement 
mechanisms and informs strategic and contingent behaviour of those who do 
comply with rules. The graduated sanctions ingredient holds that to deter 
participants from excessive violations of community rules by taking 
graduated sanctions which increase incrementally based on either the severity 
or the repetition of violations. According to Ostrom (1990), low cost conflict 
resolution mechanisms suggest that  conflicts among unit users or between 
users and association members should be mediated in local arenas at low cost.  
Without compliance with such principles, Ostrom suggests that it could 
be difficult to expect the existence of enduring condominium commons.  With 
this understanding, this study tried to address these principles in the context of 
condominium management. The empirical evidence indicated that these 
principles were not adhered to. The data from the review of policy documents 
indicated that a particular point in the condominium agreement covers the 
issues of monitoring and gradual sanctions. The condominium agreement 
clearly states that the general responsibility for monitoring and undertaking 
gradual sanctions shall be taken by Technical Committee Members (TCM) 
elected by the owners at the annual general meeting. This study tried to 
compare the actual practice to what is written in the agreement. For this 
purpose, in-depth interviews were conducted with elected TCMs, members of 
the boards of owners associations, and residents. Most of the residents were 
deeply dissatisfied with the performance of the TCM. The owners’ 
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association TCM also indicated that effective monitoring and taking measures 
against those who were breaking the rules did not always occur. This view 
implies that, although the regulation is over-ambitious regarding the 
monitoring mechanism and the gradual sanctions, the research indicated that 
requirements of the agreement are ignored or are not given enough attention 
by the owners’ associations.   
Data obtained through questionnaire showed that monitoring of local 
norms/rules/ in the management condominiums is ineffective. Most 
questionnaire respondents (96%) confirmed that, although there have been 
violations of the rules by owners and/or tenants, the association has never 
monitored them and has not taken appropriate actions or studied the extent of 
violations. Most of the TCMs and board members agreed. However, there 
were differences in opinions given by TCMs, board members, and residents 
regarding the possible reasons for the failure. According to the TCM, the 
major problems that resulted in a poor monitoring system emanate from the 
condominium agreement itself.  In particular, they mentioned that provisions 
that deal with powers and duties of TCMs were too general in what they said 
about monitoring and lacked clarity on how it was to be implemented. Some 
of the TCM members remarked that specific, separate and clear rules or 
frameworks about monitoring the commons and compliance of collective 
action must, therefore, be adapted to the specific needs of the TCM.  On the 
other hand, residents stated that the problem is associated with TCMs’ lack of 
awareness and sensitivity about monitoring and that their failure to take action 
on many occasions was evidence that TCMs had not given adequate attention 
to monitoring.  
According to the TCM and the members of the association board, most 
of the residents do not know the rules and are not committed to working with 
the association. Consequently, residents failed to inform the association the 
types of violations being committed and who is committing them. The TCM 
and the board members also expected that the problem would continue unless 
residents were willing to cooperate and work with the association. They stated 
that residents should maintain a high level of awareness regarding owners’ 
associations as well as TCMs’ objectives since apathy and a lack of interest 
on the part of residents toward TCM has been experienced. Regardless of the 
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reasons, Ostrom’s principle on monitoring and taking appropriate sanctions 
on those who violate operational rules are not practised. This finding shows 
that an improved commitment to monitoring, better mechanisms for doing so, 
and clear decisions about this issue are essential ingredients for improving 
condominium management in Bahir Dar city. 
Ostrom argued that rapid access to local arenas for resolving conflicts 
among resource users is very important for successfully managing commons. 
The institutional arrangements for condominium management in the Amhara 
region seem to fit with Ostrom’s principle of having readily available, low-
cost dispute resolution mechanisms. Data regarding the laws on 
condominiums showed that this task is assumed to be accomplished by 
representative user committees, local elders or associations. The law clearly 
specifies that whenever conflicts arise neither the board nor the association 
management members are the main bodies responsible for initially dealing 
with the problem. Conflicts are to be dealt with by the concerned parties 
themselves.  If they are not able to solve the problem, the next step is to 
communicate in writing with a standard technical committee that is selected at 
a general meeting for compliance monitoring. This technical committee is 
given the power to delegate the case to local elected elders other than the 
technical committee or the courts.  
With regard to the practice of conflict resolution, data gathered from 
the residents indicated that using simple delegation to resolve a dispute 
requires interpretation and extrapolation processes, making dispute resolution 
difficult, time-consuming and costly. The study underlined that an 
intervention by local elders or a technical committee’s agreement is unlikely 
to directly address the main problems. According to most residents, the main 
reasons that conflict resolution is difficult are that members of technical 
committees and local elders lack skill and experiences in resolving the real-
life problems. They also remarked that both local elders and TCMs often 
failed to make definitive decisions, and instead postponed the resolution of 
both simple and difficult issues to avoid uncomfortable confrontations. 
Representatives of technical committees and selected local elders were 
asked about what kinds of legal procedures they follow and apply to resolve 
disputes over condominium ownership. Surprisingly, not all associations have 
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clear and binding procedures for dispute resolution. According to owners’ 
associations, the TCM and local elders only acted as basic information 
providers and observers. TCM and local elders would not give any concrete 
support and assistance to owners in addressing conflicts. Instead, owners dealt 
with disputes by themselves. According to owners’ associations, TCMs and 
local elders, this is because there are no clear local norms/rules concerning 
conflict resolution procedures that would give them better protection for their 
decisions. In addition, in Ethiopia in general and in Bahir Dar city in 
particular, there are no standard contracts performing a service to both 
owners’ and renters. As a result, owners’ associations do not have the right to 
intervene in contractual relations between individuals in order to provide 
simplicity, clarity, and order. If conflicts arises on issues associated with who 
determine what should be agreed on - the initial rent, rent adjustments, date of 
payment, penalty for delays, conditions for eviction , both owners and renters  
are not  helped  by the owners’ associations TCMs and local elders. 
Apart from the existing too general regulations that cannot 
accommodate all the conflicts that may arise while living in condominium, 
there is a lack of guidance and instruction on how to resolve conflicts. Most 
of the TCMs stated that the major reasons for avoiding confrontations and 
failing to deal with trivial issues are: a lack of experience, an absence of 
sufficient information about the structure of conflict resolution mechanisms 
by TCMs and unit residents, and an absence of detailed regulations as a legal 
protection for their decisions. Furthermore, there is also another gap in 
regulation, not yet mentioned, that must be considered for effective 
management of condominium. This implies that a strategy of governance that 
enables holistic thinking and action is one of the missing factors and this is a 
significant obstacle to implement the laws. 
 
4.4. The patterns of interaction  
The pattern of interaction relates to the last two principles of Ostrom - 
minimum recognition of rights and nested enterprises. The first of these 
stipulates that external government agencies should not challenge the right of 
local users to create their own institutions. The second principle confirms that 
there should be sets of rules established within a hierarchy of users’ 
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institutions. In this regard, the documentary analysis of the laws on 
condominiums showed that unit owners are allowed to have their own 
institutions. At the same time, provision, monitoring and sanctioning, conflict 
resolution, and other governance activities are organized in a nested structure 
with multiple layers of activities. It has to be emphasised, however, that the 
empirical evidence for these principles was not available in the city. 
This study indicated that the principle of minimum recognition of rights 
failed in part as a result of a failure to recognize local knowledge and existing 
institutions in the early stages of the devolution process and during the 
implementation period. It also showed that, although there are chains of 
command and governance activities which are organized in multiple layers of 
nested enterprises, the nested activities are not working well. This implies that 
instructions are written in administrative procedures, laws and legislations but 
they are not known by the residents and have never been enforced.  
Therefore, providing nested enterprises for the management of 
commons does not necessarily result in good patterns of interaction among 
residents. In this area, the most important problems in condominium 
management are (1) not realizing that the success of associations depends on 
the amount of information provided to user residents, (2) a failure to create 
incentives for unit owners to coordinate with each other, and (3) a failure to 
develop trust, certainty and respect in the owners’ associations. This implies 
that the city administration needs not only to craft institutional arrangements 
but also to ensure that they are effectively communicated to, and internalized 
by, users. Similarly, owners’ associations need to strive not only to implement 
management procedures that are developed by owners through a 
representative form of self-government but also to develop community spirit 
and address quality of life issues, because self-governance requires collective 
action combined with information.   
A board member said, “patterns of interaction can be robustly 
conflictual, especially when there is no fair and legitimate allocation of rights 
and obligations in the community of users and in their values and goals”. So 
there should be clear local norms/rules for the elected members of the 
association concerning monitoring, decisions on sanctions, and conflict 
resolution mechanisms. Without such specific strategies and actions, 
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implementing a nested structure with multiple layers of activities will be 
difficult.  
 
4.5 Analyzing outcomes 
This study had the objective of establishing institutions as a baseline for the 
analysis of outcomes. The three main objectives of institutions in 
condominium management are providing fair distributional equity, optimal 
management and use of the commons, and encouraging sustainability through 
innovation and adaptation in response to change. Therefore, the analysis of 
the performance of institutions focuses on fiscal equivalence, efficiency, and 
sustainability.  
 
Fiscal Equivalence  
In principle, beneficiaries need to pay reasonable and proportional payments 
for the services they receive. Based on this principle, those who receive 
greater benefits should pay more than those who receive fewer benefits and 
all unit owners should get their own share of common property. In situations 
where there is diversity among residents of condominium houses, the costs 
and benefits should vary accordingly. In the current study, however, there was 
no such arrangement, and thus shares are not defined according to the unit(s) 
owned. This study found that one of the major reasons for negative patterns of 
interaction was the lack of a fair and legitimate allocation of rights and 
obligations in the community of users. The current institutional arrangements 
lack clear distribution of rights and obligations that determine each owner’s 
responsibility for the costs of maintaining and repairing the common parts of 
the property, as well as for the operating costs of the owners’ association.    
Problems in carrying out collective action in condominium houses can 
occur when there is unfair distribution of rights and obligations held by the 
parties involved. The willingness of owners to accept the need to pay higher 
costs for their housing is a crucial element in securing and strengthening the 
advantages of condominium ownership. This paper finding demonstrates that 
applying the concept of ownership associations and sustainability in carrying 
out collective action relationships is, in practice, quite difficult. The analysis 
shows that unfair distribution of benefit and cost are very deeply embedded in 
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condominium houses. This difficulties have generate incentives that prevent 
residents from getting together to resolve the collective-action problem. These 
perverse incentives lead owner / renters not to participate in democratic 
decisions on what costs levels are acceptable and for what purposes the 
accumulated income should be spent. They have no full insight into how the 
money was actually used.  
 
Efficiency  
In relation to institutional performance, this study focused on the extent to 
which the institutional context facilitates low-cost information sharing or 
transparency in some areas such as the relative capacity or skill of users to 
evaluate the actions of others in the policy situation and the extent to which 
users have access to mechanisms that permit them to monitor and sanction 
one another. The study found that most of the laws, rules and regulations on 
condominiums were merely written in administrative procedures and were not 
known by the users. It is known that all effective governance systems at 
multiple levels depend on good, trustworthy information about institutions, 
commons, and processes within the entities being governed and within the 
institutions themselves (Hess and Ostrom, 2007).In the case of Bahir Dar city, 
most residents are ignorant of the laws and this means the capacity of users to 
evaluate the actions of others in policy situations is poor.  
Concerning the extent to which users have access to mechanisms that 
permit them to monitor and sanction one another, as discussed above, there 
are no effective and transparent legal procedures for monitoring, or for 
handling conflicts and imposing modest sanctions on offenders. Imbalances 
were also observed in relation to responsibility and accountability. This 
implies that all unit users and communities are not involved in such activities 
and as a result the existing monitoring, sanction and conflict resolution 
mechanisms are not operational.  In general, those who monitor behaviour, 
handle conflict and impose sanctions were not perceived as effective and 
legitimate by residents and there were no crosschecks on the opportunistic 
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Sustainability  
In relation to sustainability, the condominium proclamation clearly state that, 
the unit owners’ association is responsible for repairing the commons and the 
assets of the association damaged by accident. The unit owners’ association is 
responsible for maintaining the commons and units if unit owners fail to 
maintain them within a reasonable period of time. Furthermore, the unit 
owners’ association may improve the buildings and their surroundings when 
necessary. However, the practice indicated that condominium management 
systems do not meet the current needs of many unit users. The TCMs reported 
that the absence of renter involvement in decision making has had negative 
effects on attempts to enhance the quality of condominium management. The 
analysis shows that the principal outcomes  against lack of renters 
participation in decision making unit  is that,  it tends to distort social, 
economic and political incentives, leading to inefficient use of condominium 
property. Most owners’ associations also agreed that renters are not interested 
in making efforts to sustain the use of condominiums. This disincentive is 
because of a lack of certainty about owners’ association decisions and poor 
incentive mechanisms. The study also showed that there is no information 
about controlling systems that should be available to all unit owners at 
owners’ meetings, and objective criticism of owners’ performances became 
difficult.  
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations  
In Bahir Dar city, an external government agency (the city administration) has 
developed and implemented its own rules on how owners’ associations should 
be established and should act on behalf of all the owners of the condominium, 
but do not challenge the right of condominium unit owners to create their own 
institutions. The study also revealed that local and formal institutions’ 
involvement in assisting, teaching and creating awareness to improve the 
knowledge of condominium unit users on how to use and manage jointly 
owned property has been very weak.  
The study finding indicated that Ostrom’s design principles are 
incorporated in the institutions crafted for condominium management, but 
they are not well configured and practised. Furthermore, the study revealed 
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that there are clearly defined boundaries for the resource and user groups and 
communities. Such clarity is important for efficient management of 
condominiums, but there is no clear identification of rights to resources and 
rules about each unit owner’s share of the commons. In addition, there is no 
congruence between residents’ aspirations, provision rules, and local 
conditions. Hence, owners and occupants do not have equal rights and 
obligations. The adverse impacts of imbalances in decision-making 
arrangements in general meetings have contributed to the failures in the 
management of condominium.  
The rules about what a participant in a position must, must not, or may 
do in a particular action situation are not known by residents. Rules in use are 
merely written in administrative procedures and legislation, but they are not 
known by the unit users. Indeed, most of the rules are not enforced. This 
study also revealed that the monitoring system is not effective in maintaining 
condominium commons, and it also failed to make condominium commons a 
public affair and it failed to facilitate effective decentralized monitoring. 
Graduated sanctions are not implemented to maintain community cohesion 
and there is no effective punishment system to check severe breaches of rules. 
Furthermore, conflict resolution mechanisms are not available or easily 
accessible, and this makes successful management of condominium commons 
more difficult. More importantly the study found that fundamental problems 
in condominium management resulted from a lack of knowledge about 
condominium laws and operations on the part of residents and managers 
(owners’ associations).  
Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations are 
made for future policy, advocacy and research. In general, the 
recommendations relate to three issues, namely institutional structures, 
implementation and evaluation of owners’ association performance. 
Formal institutional arrangements are an essential tool to facilitate 
management in complex and multiple-use condominium commons. The 
establishment and regulation of condominiums, their function, and details of 
the inner workings of the condominium should be clearly understood and 
internalized by all condominium owners and unit users. Institutional 
arrangements for condominium ownership should be accompanied by special 
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guidelines covering the different aspects of establishing and operating 
condominiums. There should be a mechanism that allows resident to 
participate in modifying or changing the institution according to their mutual 
interest. Inspectors may not perform satisfactorily if they do not directly 
benefit from improved resource conditions. Thus, it may be important to 
publicise information about the conditions of the condominium commons. 
There should be also an incentive for each unit user to engage in supervising 
the actions of others and to help the owners’ associations to control the use of 
the commons.  Graduated sanctions should be devised for non-compliance 
with collective rules, and there should be mechanisms to inform all 
condominium unit users that acting against the rules is a major offence. To 
resolve disputes in a low-cost and orderly manner, there should be a 
mechanism that enables residents to elect users who are experienced and 
skilled in such matters. Furthermore, training on the subject and awareness 
creation among users needs to be provided. The possibility of institutional 
improvement or changes to rules should not be cosmetic. Rather, there should 
be a mechanism to provide information on conditions, requirements and 
related criteria for the practical improvement of the institution. The existing 
institutions should allow the managements of condominiums to take care of 
the interests of all beneficiaries rather than focus on some users (owners) and 
ignore others (renters). Specialised decision-making arrangements involving 
all unit users are required. Coordination of condominium commons use is also 
required to balance their multiple uses and interests. Collective action in the 
multiple uses of condominium houses needs to be further researched. Despite 
the difficulties involved in controlling the quality of work and providing 
objective criticism of performance, outcome indicators should be developed 
and used to evaluate the performance of management. Evaluation results 
should be used to change goals, objectives, management strategies and 
desired outcomes, if necessary.   
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